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I. Introduction 
Articulated as a priority in President Trump’s executive 
orders, his administration has forcefully pushed to sign more 
287(g) agreements (and more aggressive forms of those 
agreements) with local law enforcement agencies (LEAs).1 In the 
summer of 2017, the administration signed eighteen new 
                                                                                                     
 * Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law; A.B., Harvard 
College; J.D., Harvard Law School. I am grateful to my hard-working team of 
research assistants: Maddie Churchman, Ryan Kinkade, Emma Martin, and 
Daniel Weinstein.  
 1. See Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8800 (Jan. 25, 2017) 
(expanding federal-state agreements); Amanda Sakuma, Donald Trump’s Plan to 
Outsource Immigration Enforcement to Local Cops, ATLANTIC (Feb. 18, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/trump-immigration-enforce 
ment/517071/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (discussing Trump’s plan to enlist the 
assistance of local authorities to carry out his immigration plans) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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agreements in the state of Texas alone.2 At the end of 2017, there 
were at least thirty-eight other LEAs interested in joining the 
program.3 Once these agreements come online, the result will be 
more local law enforcement officers deputized to enforce 
immigration laws than have ever existed in the history of the 
287(g) program. 
What are the implications of this deputization? On one level, 
we have had greater than fifteen years’ experience with 287(g) 
agreements, so we could expect this administration’s resurrection 
of the program to result in more of the same dynamic that we have 
seen in past years. But given this administration’s plans to 
significantly expand the program, together with other components 
of its aggressive immigration policies, this Article suggests that 
implementation of the 287(g) program under the Trump 
administration will look different, in significantly harsher ways, 
than under previous administrations. 
First, the profile of immigrants who are deported through this 
program under the Trump administration will likely look different 
from those deported under the Obama administration. Upon 
taking office, President Trump revoked policies instituted under 
the Obama administration that prioritized the removal of recently 
arrived immigrants and those with serious criminal histories.4 
These Obama priorities, in turn, placed restrictions on the types of 
immigrants who could be removed through federal–sub-federal 
                                                                                                     
 2. See ICE Announces 18 New 287(g) Agreements in Texas, U.S. IMMIGR. & 
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (July 31, 2017), https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ice-
announces-18-new-287g-agreements- texas (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (noting the 
increase in the number of agreements ICE has entered into since 2016) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 3. See Mica Rosenberg & Reade Levinson, Police in Trump-Supporting 
Towns Aid Immigration Officials in Crackdown, REUTERS (Nov. 27, 2017, 6:16 
AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trump-effect-immigration-police/police-
in-trump-supporting-towns-aid-immigration-officials-in-crackdown-idUSKBN1 
DR169 (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (reporting that police departments across the 
nation have been deputized to assist in the immigration plans under the Trump 
administration) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). See generally 
REUTERS, 287(G) GRAPHICS DATA, (2017), http://fingfx.thomsonreuters.com/gfx/ 
rngs/TRUMP-EFFECT-IMMIGRATION-POLICE/010051YZ4FG/287ggraphics% 
20data.pdf (highlighting the increased interest of law enforcement agencies 
seeking to assist in Trump’s immigration programming). 
 4. See Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8800 (Jan. 25, 2017) 
(expanding the enforcement and removal priorities). 
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cooperation programs.5 Trump’s revocation of the Obama 
administration’s priorities, and his assertion of his own long list of 
broadly worded new enforcement “priorities” means that, 
effectively, all immigrants with unauthorized status are now 
priorities for removal.6 Trickling down to the 287(g) context, 
deputized local law enforcement seem to have much more latitude 
to target all immigrants for immigration enforcement, without 
regard for their actual dangerousness. 
Second, the 287(g) program under the Trump administration 
may employ more powerful forms of agreements than existed 
under the Obama administration. Through his executive orders, 
President Trump has expressed a willingness to resurrect the task 
force model (which would broaden powers and geographic range to 
LEAs compared to the more traditional jailhouse enforcement 
model), a model the Obama administration phased out in 2012 
amid concerns about its special vulnerability to racial profiling.7 
And in an agency memo, the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) gave permission to Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP) to sign 287(g) agreements, rather than limiting agreements 
to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (the agency responsible 
for interior immigration enforcement and the traditional federal 
partner for 287(g) agreements).8 The combination of these 
                                                                                                     
 5. See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., 
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. 
Immigration & Customs Enf’t (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/ 
files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion.pdf (outlining new 
policies and guidelines with respect to the apprehension, detention, and removal 
of aliens in the United States) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 6. See David A. Martin, Trump’s Order on the Deportation of Undocumented 
Residents, Annotated by an Immigration Law Expert, VOX, https://www. 
sanctuary-trump (last updated Jan. 31, 2017) (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (noting 
the broadly sweeping language used in the Trump administration executive 
orders) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 7. See FY 2012: ICE Announces Year-End Removal Numbers, Highlights 
Focus on Key Priorities and Issues New National Detainer Guidance to Further 
Focus Resources, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (Dec. 20, 2012), 
https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/fy-2012-ice-announces-year-end-removal-
numbers-highlights-focus-key-priorities-and (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) 
[hereinafter FY 2012: ICE Announces Year-End Removal Numbers] (reporting 
year-end removal numbers and setting forth guidelines highlighting the priorities 
for removal) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 8. See Read the Memos Signed by DHS Secretary Kelly on New Guidelines 
for Deporting Illegal Immigrants, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2017), 
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potentially more potent forms of agreements, together with the 
new policy making every immigrant a removal priority, could be 
combustible: newly deputized local law enforcement officers could 
effectively operate like fully empowered immigration agents, 
questioning and detaining people encountered on the streets based 
on immigration status. 
The third difference is the Trump administration’s seeming 
lack of concern for the racial profiling and other civil rights dangers 
inherent in 287(g) programs. Critics of sub-federal enforcement of 
immigration laws—and even some proponents—point to 
substantial evidence that local law enforcement officers who have 
concurrent immigration authority often target individuals for 
criminal law action based on accent or skin color, knowing that 
those individuals will likely face removal proceedings.9 Singular 
among administrations that have implemented the 287(g) 
program, the Trump administration has shown little interest in 
protecting the civil rights of immigrants. The 287(g) agreements 
signed by the Trump administration continue to require local 
agencies to abide by federal civil rights laws and continue to 
provide a complaint process for reporting misconduct.10 But Mr. 
Trump’s statements on this subject as a candidate and his action 
as President raise serious doubts that civil rights violations 
committed under the authority of a 287(g) agreement will be 
prosecuted.  
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II provides a brief 
history of the 287(g) program, including its iterations under 
different presidential administrations. Part III analyzes the role of 
these agreements in the Trump administration’s enforcement 
                                                                                                     
http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/national/read-the-memos-signed-
by-dhs-secretary-kelly-on-new-guidelines-for-deporting-illegal-immigrants/2338/ 
(last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (explaining the new guidelines for deportation of 
illegal aliens and the expansion of enforcement entities to fulfill the new plans) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 9. See The 287(g) Program: An Overview, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Mar. 15, 
2017), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/287g-program-
immigration (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (explaining the 287(g) program) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 10. See generally, e.g., U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, MEMORANDUM OF 
AGREEMENT (2017), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/287gMOA/TarrantCounty Sheriff. 
pdf (containing an agreement between ICE and the Tarrant County Sherriff’s 
Office). 
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policies, focusing on their rapid expansion, especially in the border 
areas; this section also considers the implications of this rapid 
deputization. In Part IV I offer some concluding thoughts. 
II. 287(g) Program: History and Early Operations 
A. Congress’s Vision 
The 287(g) program was enacted as part of the omnibus Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(IIRIRA),11 which substantially increased penalties on immigrants 
who violated U.S. law (either as unauthorized immigrants who 
violated immigration laws or authorized immigrants who violated 
other laws).12 Though there is abundant legislative history for 
IIRIRA generally, very little exists to explain why Congress 
decided to enact the 287(g) program at this point in time, or in this 
particular form. 
Against this sparse legislative history, we turn to the 
statutory language. Section 287(g) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act13 authorizes the Department of Homeland 
Security to enter into agreements with a state or political 
subdivision “to perform a function of an immigration officer in 
relation to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens 
in the United States (including the transportation of such aliens 
across State lines to detention centers) . . . .”14 The specifics of the 
immigration functions are left to DHS and the state or political 
subdivision to negotiate through a written agreement.15 The 
statute further provides that the 287(g) officers (a subset of the 
larger local law enforcement agency) will continue to be paid by 
                                                                                                     
 11. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). 
 12. See Dara Lind, The Disastrous, Forgotten 1996 Law that Created Today’s 
Immigration Law, VOX (April 28, 2016, 8:40 AM), https://www.vox.com/2016/ 
4/28/11515132/iirira-clinton-immigration (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (discussing 
the impact of the 1996 immigration bill in the wake of legislation passed in the 
Reagan administration) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 13. 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (2012). 
 14. Id. 
 15. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(5) (2012) (outlining the performance of 
immigration officer functions by state officers and employees).  
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their local agencies16 and must receive federal certification that 
they have been trained on relevant federal immigration laws.17 
The key to understanding 287(g) agreements is to understand 
that 287(g) delegates officers federal powers. In contrast to other 
federal–sub-federal cooperation programs, these officers are not 
merely exercising their own enforcement authority in partnership 
with federal immigration agencies; rather, they are receiving 
federal immigration powers to use, albeit under federal 
supervision. For example, through the Criminal Alien Program 
(CAP), LEAs provide ICE with lists of detainees held in their jails 
and allow ICE access (either physical access or video access) to 
interview detainees of interest.18 The cooperation sought from 
LEAs under this program focuses on powers that the LEAs already 
have as part of their law enforcement authority: information on 
detainees they have arrested for non-immigration reasons and 
access to those detainees within their jails. 
Similarly, through the newly-resurrected Secure 
Communities program, LEAs are asked to detain immigrants of 
interest beyond their usual release date, to allow ICE more time to 
pick them up and place them in removal proceedings.19 Again, 
LEAs are being asked to use their pre-existing criminal law powers 
to assist ICE with immigration law enforcement. That LEAs use 
their own criminal enforcement powers in honoring ICE detainer 
requests has been underscored in federal judicial decisions issued 
in cases challenging the constitutionality of detainer holds. For 
                                                                                                     
 16. See id. § 1357(g)(1) (discussing the particular powers of the Attorney 
General in entering agreements with a State).  
 17. See id. § 1357(g)(2) (noting the restrictions on State power in performing 
an agreement entered into with the Attorney General).  
 18. See ANDREA GUTTIN, IMMIGR. POLICY CTR., THE CRIMINAL ALIEN PROGRAM: 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS, 1, 5 (2010), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/Crimin
al_Alien_Program_021710.pdf (providing a detailed analysis of immigration 
policies in Texas). 
 19. See Secretary Napolitano Announces New Agreement for State and Local 
Immigration Enforcement Partnerships & Adds 11 New Agreements, U.S. DEP’T 
OF HOMELAND SECURITY (July 10, 2009), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2009/07/10/ 
secretary-announces-new-agreement-state-and-local-immigration-enforcement 
(last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (“[P]articipating local law enforcement agencies are 
required to pursue all criminal charges that originally caused the offender to be 
taken into custody.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
287(g) AGREEMENTS IN THE TRUMP ERA 1259 
example, in Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas County,20 the district 
court held that the sheriff’s office violated the plaintiff immigrant’s 
Fourth Amendment rights when it continued to hold her beyond 
her release date based on an ICE detainer request; though ICE 
might have had legal authority to detain the immigrant for those 
additional days, the LEA could not piggyback on ICE’s civil 
authority to detain when it was exercising its criminal detention 
powers.21 
By contrast, when an LEA signs a 287(g) agreement, it 
receives new powers related to immigration enforcement that it did 
not previously possess. For example, when the Hall County 
Sheriff’s Office22 signed a 287(g) agreement in 2016, it gained the 
power to interrogate detainees about their immigration status, 
process detainees for immigration violations, serve warrants of 
arrest for immigration violations, prepare evidence for immigrant 
processing (including taking fingerprints and photographs, 
interviewing the immigrant, preparing affidavits and taking sworn 
statements for ICE review), preparing charging documents (the 
Notice to Appear that officially starts the removal process), issuing 
requests for detainers and release information (such as asking 
another LEA when it plans to release the immigrant), and 
transporting the immigrant to ICE detention facilities.23 Hall 
County’s agreement is a jailhouse model of enforcement, meaning 
that the 287(g) functions are limited to the jailhouse, after 
immigrants have been arrested for other reasons. As explained in 
more detail below, LEAs which agree to a task force model 
                                                                                                     
 20. No. 3:12-cv-0217-ST, 2014 WL 1414305 (D. Ore. Apr. 11, 2014). 
 21. See id. at *11; see also Morales v. Chadbourne, 996 F. Supp. 2d 19, 39 
(D.R.I. 2014) (holding that the detention of an immigrant based on an 
immigration detainer “for purposes of mere investigation is not permitted.”).  
 22. Hall County, Georgia is about one hour north of Atlanta. Driving 
Directions from Atlanta, GA to Hall County, GA, GOOGLE MAPS, 
http://maps.google.com (follow “Directions” hyperlink; then search starting point 
field for “Atlanta, GA” and search destination field for “Hall County, GA”). 
 23. See generally U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, MEMORANDUM OF 
AGREEMENT, (2016) [hereinafter HALL COUNTY SHERRIFF’S DEPARTMENT ICE 
AGREEMENT], https://www.ice.gov/doclib/287gMOA/r_287ghallcountyso.pdf 
(highlighting an agreement between ICE and the Hall County Sherriff’s 
Department). 
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agreement have even more expansive immigration-related 
powers.24  
With this delegation of its powers, ICE gains more federal 
control over 287(g) LEAs (or at least the potential for that control), 
as compared with the control it has in other federal–sub-federal 
cooperation programs.25 Much of that control follows from the 
statutory structure of the 287(g) program: the LEAs can only 
perform the immigration functions that ICE agrees to give them,26 
the individual officers agree to be subject to the “direction and 
supervision” of ICE,27 and notwithstanding that the agreements 
have an expiration date, ICE or the LEA can unilaterally decide to 
terminate at any time.28 Beyond the federal statute, the 287(g) 
agreements, which ICE drafts and seem to be almost identical in 
content, also provide opportunities for ICE to assert control. In 
signing the agreements, LEAs generally agree to abide by federal 
immigration priorities29 and federal civil rights laws,30 to use 
federally defined procedures for processing 287(g)-related 
complaints,31 to collect data related to their 287(g) work,32 to 
provide translators as needed,33 and to meet annually with ICE to 
                                                                                                     
 24. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE PERFORMANCE OF 287(G) 
AGREEMENTS REPORT UPDATE 3 (2010), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/ 
OIG_10-124_Sep10.pdf (discussing the increased authority of law enforcement 
agencies from agreements entered into with ICE). 
 25. The federal control that exists in the letter of the law has not always 
been borne out in practice. See Notes 62–67 and 79–86 and accompanying text. 
 26. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) (2012) (noting authority of the Attorney 
General to enter into agreements with State agencies).  
 27. See id. § 1357(g)(3) (discussing that State agencies are under the 
authority of the Attorney General).  
 28. See, e.g., HALL COUNTY SHERRIFF’S DEPARTMENT ICE AGREEMENT, supra 
note 23, at 10 (detailing the agreement between ICE and the Hall County 
Sherriff’s Department). 
 29. See, e.g., id. at 2 (describing the authorized function of the State within 
the agreement with ICE). 
 30. See, e.g., id. at 8 (detailing the liability and responsibility of the State 
agency). 
 31. See, e.g., id. (noting the federally mandated procedures that must be 
followed by the State). 
 32. See, e.g., id. at 7 (discussing reporting requirements while carrying out 
the agreement). 
 33. See, e.g., id. at 8 (noting requirements to secure the assistance of a 
translator if necessary). 
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review and ensure compliance with the agreements’ 
requirements.34 
The deeper level of federal control in the 287(g) program 
becomes apparent when contrasted with other federal–sub-federal 
cooperation programs. Through Secure Communities, the LEAs 
can decide for themselves whether, and to what extent, they want 
to honor immigration detainers or inform ICE of immigrants’ 
release dates.35 Even when an LEA decides to participate, it can 
limit the conditions of its participation, for example, only honoring 
detainers for immigrants convicted or charged with serious 
crimes.36 Indeed, most of the sub-federal governments that have 
been dubbed “sanctuary” cities or states do not entirely eliminate 
cooperation with federal immigration authorities, but rather, limit 
the circumstances for that cooperation. For example, San Diego 
Police Department’s policy is to report individuals to USCIS only 
when police arrest individuals based on probable cause that they 
had committed a felony and reasonable suspicion that they have 
violated federal immigration laws.37 Accordingly, San Diego PD is 
prohibited from releasing individuals to ICE or Border Patrol who 
(1) witnessed a crime, (2) were contacted during a family 
disturbance, (3) were involved in a minor traffic offense 
(infractions and nonbookable offenses), and (4) are seeking medical 
treatment.38 
Equipped with this understanding of congressional intent, 
with its combination of delegated federal powers and increased 
federal control, we turn now to an analysis of how the 287(g) 
                                                                                                     
 34. See, e.g., id. at 9 (outlining the requirement that LEAs meet annually 
with ICE to ensure compliance with the terms of the agreement). 
 35. See Ming H. Chen, Trust in Immigration Enforcement: State 
Noncooperation and Sanctuary Cities After Secure Communities, 91 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 13, 35–39 (2016) (detailing how some states have limited the scope of 
cooperation with Secure Communities). 
 36. See id. at 37 (describing California legislation that permitted LEA 
cooperation with ICE detainer requests only if the individual committed a violent 
felony). 
 37. See SAN DIEGO POLICE DEPARTMENT PROCEDURE 4 (2014) (citing 
California Government Code § 53069.75 preventing local law from prohibiting 
reporting to INS where an individual committed a felon and is suspected of 
violating immigration law). 
 38. Id. at 3. 
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program has evolved under the different presidential 
administrations. 
B. Agreements Under the Bush Administration (2002–2007) 
Though authorized by Congress in 1996, the first 287(g) 
agreement wasn’t signed until 2002, shortly after the 9/11 attacks. 
Those attacks were a catalyst for the 287(g) program and 
sub-federal immigration regulation generally. Before the attacks, 
the federal government’s longstanding legal position was that 
states only had authority to enforce criminal immigration laws.39 
But months after the attacks, Attorney General John Ashcroft 
invited states, using their “inherent authority” as sovereigns, to 
enforce both civil and criminal immigration laws.40 Florida was the 
first state to respond, signing a 287(g) agreement in 2002 with the 
then-Immigration and Naturalization Service.41  
Given its special links to the attacks and apparent 
vulnerability to terrorist infiltration (thirteen of the nineteen 
hijackers had spent time there, getting Florida driver’s licenses 
and attending flight training school in the state), Florida’s 
participation made sense, as the federal government emphasized 
the program’s national security focus.42 Florida’s agreement 
empowered its newly created Regional Domestic Security Task 
                                                                                                     
 39. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ASSISTANCE BY STATE AND LOCAL POLICE IN 
APPREHENDING ILLEGAL ALIENS 26, 31–32 (Feb. 5, 1996), 
https://www.justice.gov/file/20111/download (describing a memorandum from 
Legal Counsel of the U.S. Department of Justice to the United States Attorney 
for the Southern District of California).  
 40. Attorney General John Ashcroft, Prepared Remarks on the National 
Security Entry-Exit Registration System (June 6, 2002), 
https://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2002/060502agpreparedremarks.ht
m (last visited on Sept. 18, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 41. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the INS and the State of 
Florida (July 26, 2002), reprinted in 79 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1138, app. II at 
1140 (2002) (outlining authority provided to Florida state and local officers). 
These officers were trained by the INS and then placed in Florida’s seven Regional 
Domestic Security Task Forces. Id. at 1140–41. 
 42. See generally Identity and Immigration Status of 9/11 Terrorists, FAIR 
(Jan. 2017) http://www.fairus.org/issue/national-security/identity-and-
immigration-status-911-terrorists (last visited Oct. 2, 2018) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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Forces to carry out limited immigration enforcement duties, all 
focused on domestic security concerns. As a result of its 287(g) 
activities, the state of Florida reported that it had detained 
individuals apparently involved in “surveillance activities in 
sensitive locations”; the state also reported conducting 
investigations resulting in the arrests of unauthorized immigrants 
working in restricted or secured areas of seaports, airports, and 
nuclear plants.43 
A few other sub-federal jurisdictions soon followed suit and 
signed 287(g) agreements; those jurisdictions included the state of 
Alabama and the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department.44 
These initial agreements were also targeted in scope, focusing on 
immigrants with criminal records or who otherwise presented a 
threat to public safety.45 In his July 2005 testimony in front of a 
Homeland Security subcommittee, Paul Kilcoyne, Deputy 
Assistant Director of ICE’s Office of Investigations, assured 
Congressional members that the 287(g) program would remain 
“focused on criminal organizations, those individuals who pose a 
threat to the border security,” and not on “the landscape architect 
that had the broken headlight.”46 
Three types of agreements developed. Under the first, a jail 
enforcement model, deputized officers can only exercise their 
delegated immigration functions on alleged noncitizens which 
LEAs arrested and detained on separate state or local charges. The 
second, a task force model, authorized deputized officers to perform 
their immigration functions during the course of their daily 
activities as patrol officers, detectives, or criminal investigators, or 
in coordination with ICE in task force settings (for example, 
                                                                                                     
 43. See The 287(g) Program: Ensuring the Integrity of America’s Border 
Security System through Federal-State Partnerships: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. On Mgmt., Integration, and Oversight of the H. Comm. on Homeland 
Sec., 109th Cong., 16 (2005) [hereinafter Kilcoyne testimony], 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109hhrg28332/pdf/CHRG-109hhrg28332.pdf 
(statement of Testimony of Paul M. Kilcoyne, Deputy Assistant Director, Office of 
Investigations, ICE). 
 44. See RANDY CAPPS ET AL., MIGRATION POL’Y INST., DELEGATION AND 
DIVERGENCE: A STUDY OF 287(G) STATE AND LOCAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 9 
(2011) (discussing a brief history of 287(g)). 
 45.  See id. (noting that Alabama and Florida signed similar targeted 
agreements). 
 46. See id. (citing Kilcoyne testimony referenced later in this Article). 
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working together on a gang-focused task force). Under the task 
force model then, the officers could interrogate alleged noncitizens 
they encountered “on the beat” and not just those who had been 
arrested on separate charges. The third, a hybrid model, combined 
elements of the jail enforcement and task force models, allowing 
immigration enforcement both on the streets and at the jails.47 
Though it continued to be publicly advertised as focusing on 
dangerous criminals and other public safety concerns,48 the 287(g) 
program experienced a significant expansion in 2006. In that year, 
some 287(g) jurisdictions adopted a universal model of 
enforcement, where the goal was to apprehend as many 
unauthorized immigrants as possible, regardless of their criminal 
records or dangerousness. The most visible example of this 
universal enforcement focus was the 287(g) agreement signed by 
Mecklenburg County, North Carolina. The county’s goal, as 
articulated by Sheriff Jim Pendergraph, was to apprehend as 
many unauthorized immigrants as possible, believing that 
unauthorized immigrants committed crimes and drained public 
resources.49 Thus, the county viewed the 287(g) program as a 
vehicle to identify for removal immigrants who had committed civil 
immigration violations.50 The county seemed to find at least some 
degree of support for its universal enforcement model within ICE. 
For example, Mecklenburg’s agreement, which became a model for 
all new agreements signed from 2007 to mid-2009,51 explicitly 
states: “It is the intent of the parties that this agreement will result 
in enhanced capacity to deal with immigration violators in the 
                                                                                                     
 47. See OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., THE PERFORMANCE OF 287(G) AGREEMENTS 
REPORT UPDATE 3 (2010), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_10-
124_Sep10.pdf (discussing progress of prior 287(g) agreements). 
 48. See CAPPS, supra note 44 (citing ICE’s 2007 fact sheet on delegating 
Section 287(g) authority) (noting the broadened scope of the 287(g) program from 
the priorities publicly known). ICE regularly updates the fact sheet, and this older 
version is no longer available on the web. 
 49. See id. at 10 (noting the emergence of universal models of enforcement 
in the southeast between 2006–2008). 
 50. See id. at 26 (citing Examining 287(g): The Role of State and Local Law 
Enforcement in Immigration Law: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland 
Sec., 111th Cong. (2009)) (providing the statement of Charles A. Jenkins, Sheriff, 
Frederick County, MD). 
 51. See id. at 10 (outlining the history of the 287(g) program). 
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County.”52 And ICE’s 2008 version of its program fact sheet 
omitted previous language that had limited enforcement to 
criminal immigrants and other security threats.53 
In 2007, the last year of the Bush administration, sub-federal 
interest in the program increased substantially; in that year alone, 
ICE signed twenty-six new agreements.54 Together with the 
enforcement expansion by some jurisdictions (switching from a 
targeted model to a universal model), the program was poised for 
significant growth during the Obama administration. 
C. Agreements Under the Obama Administration (2008–2016) 
During the Obama administration, the 287(g) program 
continued the growth of the Bush years but it also experienced 
contractions and restrictions, reflected in the fluctuating number 
of agreements and the changing scope of authority delegated to 
sub-federal jurisdictions. “The 287(g) program is an essential 
component of DHS’ comprehensive immigration enforcement 
strategy,” stated ICE Assistant Secretary John Morton.55 
Accordingly, the administration actively pursued signing new 
287(g) agreements. In 2008, it signed twenty-eight new 
                                                                                                     
 52. See U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 1 
(2002), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/287gMOA/mecklenburgcountysheriffsoffice.pdf 
(discussing the agreement made between ICE and Mecklenburg County, North 
Carolina).  
 53. See CAPPS, supra note 44, at 10–11 (outlining the history of the 287(g) 
program between 2006–2010). 
 54. See Rodriguez et al., A Program in Flux: New Priorities and 
Implementation Challenges for 287(g), MIGRATION POL’Y INST. 3 (Mar. 2010), 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/program-flux-new-priorities-and-imple 
men tation-challenges-287g (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (discussing the history of 
the 287(g) program, the specifics of the 2009 template and questions of its 
implementation) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 55. See Department of Homeland Security, Secretary Napolitano Announces 
New Agreement for State and Local Immigration Enforcement Partnerships & 
Adds 11 New Agreements, supra note 19 (noting the standardized agreement to 
enter into 287(g) agreements as well as eleven new agreements to be implemented 
across the country with local enforcement agencies) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
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agreements;56 at the peak of its 287(g) activity, the program had 
seventy-seven active agreements (2009).57  
During these years of increased interest and activity, 
Congressional funding for the program rose accordingly. 
Appropriations started at $5 million (2006), grew to $15 million 
(2007), then rose significantly to $42.1 million (2008) and $54 
million (2009), before settling at $68 million (2010–2013).58 These 
federal funds were used to pay for the training of the deputized 
officers and for program management and oversight.59 Local 
jurisdictions continued to pay for the salaries and other expenses 
of their deputized officers (including expenses during the training 
period), which constitute the largest costs of the 287(g) program.60 
As more sub-federal jurisdictions joined, the program became 
more successful by at least one metric: increasing the number of 
immigrants who are identified and placed into removal 
proceedings. Between 2005 and 2010, 287(g) officers identified and 
screened 186,000 noncitizens for potential removal.61 But as these 
numbers grew, so did criticism of the program. In a letter on behalf 
of over 500 national, state, regional and local organizations, 
Marielena Hincapie, Executive Director of National Immigration 
Law Center, implored President Obama to terminate the program. 
Citing egregious abuses by 287(g) jurisdictions, she argued, “Racial 
profiling and other civil rights abuses by the local law enforcement 
agencies that have sought out 287(g) powers have compromised 
public safety, while doing nothing to solve the immigration 
crisis.”62 Law enforcement agencies also expressed concerns about 
                                                                                                     
 56. See Rodriguez, supra note 54, at 3 (discussing the recent trend of local 
and state officials participating in immigration policies).  
 57. See Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts 
and the Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 
1582 n.88 (2010) (noting the increase in agreements entered into).  
 58. See AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, THE 287(G) PROGRAM: AN OVERVIEW 2 (2017), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/the_28
7g_program_an_overview_0.pdf (detailing specifics of the different 287(g) 
agreement types). 
 59. See id. (noting that federal funding for the 287(g) program hit a high in 
FY 2010–2013). 
 60. See id. at 3 (discussing the authority of local agencies and the selection 
process for local entities). 
 61. See CAPPS, supra note 44, at 10 (noting the expansion of the program in 
the southeast region between 2006–2008). 
 62. Letter from Marielena Hincapie, Exec. Dir. of Nat’l Immigr. Law Ctr., to 
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the program. After holding focus groups across the country that 
included local police and after administering a written survey to 
police chiefs attending a national police conference, the Police 
Foundation63 found that a majority of participating police chiefs 
believed that the costs of participating in the 287(g) program 
outweighed the potential benefits, “where there is no criminal 
nexus.”64  
In that same year, in response to a Congressional request, the 
General Accountability Office (GAO) issued a detailed review of 
the 287(g) program, in which the agency interviewed officials from 
all sub-federal agencies participating in the program and reviewed 
information provided by these agencies and ICE.65 The GAO found 
that ICE needed to impose more controls, to make sure that the 
program operated as intended. Specifically, the GAO 
recommended that ICE (1) document the program’s objectives, 
(2) describe more fully the nature and extent of its supervision over 
sub-federal jurisdictions, and (3) define what data sub-federal 
jurisdictions should collect and how it should be collected and 
reported.66 By articulating standards for the program and 
communicating those standards to participating sub-federal 
agencies, ICE would be in a position to follow up to make sure that 
the standards are being implemented.67 
                                                                                                     
President Barack Obama (Aug. 25, 2009) (on file with author). 
 63. The Police Foundation is “oldest nationally-known, non-profit, 
non-partisan, and non-membership-driven organization dedicated to improving 
America’s most noble profession—policing.” POLICE FOUND. 
https://www.policefoundation.org/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 64. See ANITA KHASHU, POLICE FOUND., THE ROLE OF LOCAL POLICE: STRIKING 
A BALANCE BETWEEN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND CIVIL LIBERTIES xii (2009), 
https://www.policefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Khashu-2009-
The-Role-of-Local-Police.pdf (highlighting the variance of immigration policies in 
response to historically high rates of immigration). 
 65. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: 
BETTER CONTROLS NEEDED OVER PROGRAM AUTHORIZING STATE AND LOCAL 
ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAWS 33 (2009), 
https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09109.pdf (highlighting the need for better 
oversight controls over programs authorizing local and state agencies to 
participate in immigration enforcement). 
 66. See id. at 24 (recommending action items for the Assistant Secretary for 
ICE). 
 67. See id. at xii (detailing the impetus for the study and recommendations 
as a result of the findings). 
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After this deluge of critical reports, immigrant advocates 
hoped that the Obama administration would cancel the 287(g) 
program.68 Instead, in July 2009, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano 
announced that ICE would sign eleven new agreements. To 
address critics’ concerns, ICE also announced that the program 
would use a new standardized template for its agreements, that 
would provide for closer federal supervision and focus the 287(g) 
program on the removal of “dangerous criminals.”69 Most of the 
changes tracked the GAO’s recommendations. First, the template 
articulated a set of enforcement priorities, making it clear that the 
purpose of the 287(g) program is to identify and process for removal 
“criminal aliens who pose a threat to public safety or a danger to 
the community.”70 The template also stated that ICE retains “sole 
discretion” on how to manage its own resources and that LEAs 
should manage their own allocation of resources according to ICE’s 
three-tiered set of priorities.71  
Second, the template was much more specific in describing 
ICE’s role in supervising LEAs. Under the task force model, an 
LEA must ask on a case-by-case basis for permission to interrogate 
and process a person solely based on immigration violations;72 the 
LEA must also ask in advance for ICE permission to conduct a 
287(g) enforcement action.73 The template also imposed new 
responsibilities on ICE to provide LEAs with data and guidance in 
specific situations.74 Finally, the template specifies the kind of 
information that LEAs are required to provide to ICE, with ICE 
                                                                                                     
 68.  See Dawn Teo, After Being Ignored by White House, 521 Immigration 
Groups Join to Protest Obama’s Inaction, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 27, 2009, 5:12 
AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/dawn-teo/after-being-ignored-by-
wh_b_270451.html (last updated May 25, 2011) (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) 
(reporting on responses to immigration policy inaction) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 69. See CAPPS, supra note 44, at 11 (detailing the new standardized 
agreement under the Obama Administration). 
 70. See Rodriguez, supra note 54, at 12 (discussing enforcement priorities 
and objectives). 
 71. Id.  
 72. See id. at 18 (discussing federal supervision).  
 73. See id. (noting how ICE monitors LEA action). 
 74. See id. (outlining the responsibilities of ICE to effectuate the new 
programming). 
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reserving the right to request specific tracking data or other 
documents related to a specific arrest.75  
The general purpose of these templates, according to Secretary 
Napolitano, was to “promote[] consistency across the board to 
ensure that all of our state and local law enforcement partners are 
using the same standards in implementing the 287(g) program.”76 
The new agreements would “support[] local efforts to protect public 
safety by giving law enforcement the tools to identify and remove 
dangerous criminal aliens.”77 Accordingly, DHS required all 
existing 287(g) jurisdictions to renegotiate their agreements to 
conform with the template; new jurisdictions also had to agree to 
use the template.78 
Did the template help the program achieve its desired 
consistency and control? The Migration Policy Institute (MPI) 
conducted an extensive review in which its researchers visited 
seven 287(g) sites operating under the new agreements and 
interviewed federal ICE officials.79 It found that the template 
changes did not have any “substantial effect on 287(g) priority 
setting, program operations, . . . or community impacts.”80 Rather, 
decisions about enforcement priorities continued to be made at the 
sub-federal levels, driven by local political pressures. For example, 
in many communities in the southeast and southwest, growing 
immigrant populations put political pressure on elected officials, 
including sheriffs, to pursue different enforcement strategies.81 
The MPI study found that the universal enforcement model 
                                                                                                     
 75. See id. (describing required updates such as how aliens are processed, 
how documentation errors are communicated, and notification requirements for 
new detainers). 
 76. See Secretary Napolitano Announces New Agreement for State and Local 
Immigration Enforcement Partnerships & Adds 11 New Agreements, supra note 
19 (noting the standardization Memorandum of Agreements used to enter into 
287(g) partnerships).  
 77. See id. 
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 80. Id. at 3.  
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continued to be concentrated in the southeast, following the 
example set by Mecklenburg County, North Carolina in 2006.82  
Though the template revisions did result in increased ICE 
supervision, that ICE supervision did not influence local 
enforcement priorities. For example, ICE supervisors signed off on 
virtually all 287(g) detainer requests that LEAs issued, even if the 
detainers were for immigrants charged with low priority crimes 
and traffic offenses.83 For jailhouse model agreements, ICE 
supervision did not extend to officers who made the initial arrests. 
Often those arresting officers worked for agencies without 287(g) 
agreements and thus were not trained in immigration law or 
subject to ICE supervision. “The lack of federal control over 
arresting officers,” warned MPI, “opens the door to racial profiling 
and pretextual arrests, especially in jurisdictions that place 
immigration detainers universally.”84 On a national level, MPI 
found that despite ICE’s attempts to refocus the program on 
serious criminal offenders, “the program is not targeted primarily 
or even mostly toward serious offenders.”85 Specifically, half of the 
detainers issued through the program were for people who were 
arrested for misdemeanors or traffics, even though these offenses 
were not considered priority offenses, according to the 2009 
template.86 
Beyond the template standardization, the Obama 
administration also made other policy changes to try to assert 
more control over the program and respond to critics’ complaints. 
In 2012, the administration announced that it would not renew 
any task force model agreements, citing the greater efficiency of 
other enforcement programs, including Secure Communities.87 
The administration was likely also responding to criticism that the 
task force model was more prone to racial profiling and other 
abuses. By delegating more powers to LEAs and allowing them to 
                                                                                                     
 82. See id. at 2 (highlighting the study’s findings). 
 83. See id. at 3 (noting that ICE allowed local agents to set enforcement 
priorities).  
 84. Id. at 2.  
 85. Id. 
 86. See id. (noting that half of the detainees were considered Level 3, the 
lowest priority ranking). 
 87. See FY 2012: ICE Announces Year-End Removal Numbers, supra note 7 
(highlighting the priorities for removal like convicted criminals).  
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exercise those powers in a broader geographic jurisdiction, critics 
charged that the task force model allows local officers to engage in 
racial profiling and other illegal practices without even requiring 
the pretense of a separate criminal charge.88 The elimination of the 
task force model (and the related hybrid model) likely had more 
symbolic, rather than practical, impact. In its 2011 in-depth 
assessment, the MPI found that the 287(g) program was primarily 
a jail-based program. For example, in FY 2010, “jail models 
accounted for 90 percent of detainers issued, while hybrid models 
accounted for 8 percent and task force models just 2 percent.”89  
As another control measure, the administration also actively 
investigated complaints received about specific 287(g) 
participants, and in two high-profile cases, ICE revoked the LEAs’ 
permission to participate in the program, based on findings of 
misconduct. The more straightforward revocation was in 
Alamance County, North Carolina. After receiving complaints that 
the Alamance County Sheriff’s Office (ACSO) engaged in 
discriminatory policing and unconstitutional searches and 
seizures, the Department of Justice in 2010 started a two-year 
investigation. Among DOJ’s findings: the ACSO was four to ten 
times more likely to stop Latino drivers than non-Latino drivers; 
the ACSO located checkpoints in majority Latino neighborhoods 
and treated stopped drivers differently based on their ethnicity; 
the ACSO improperly detained Latinos for immigration 
enforcement purposes after they had already posted bond; and the 
ACSO’s discrimination was intentional and rooted in Sheriff Terry 
S. Johnson’s prejudices against Latinos90 (Sheriff Johnson 
                                                                                                     
 88. See Ted Hesson, As One Immigration Enforcement Program Fades Away, 
Another Rises, ABC NEWS (Dec. 27, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/ABC_ 
Univision/News/immigration-enforcement-program-287g-scaled-
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 90. See generally Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Asst. Attn’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t 
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continues to serve as the county’s sheriff).91 Based on the DOJ’s 
findings, ICE terminated its 287(g) agreement with the county.92 
The more complicated revocation involved the Maricopa 
County Sheriff’s Office (MCSO), located in Arizona, because it was 
done in stages, over several years. From 1993–2016, Sheriff Joe 
Arpaio, a controversial figure who embraced his reputation as 
“America’s Toughest Sheriff,” headed the MCSO. During his 
multiple terms as sheriff, he was accused of engaging in racial 
profiling against Hispanics and in other civil rights violations as 
he ordered his deputies to enforce federal immigration laws. He 
lost multiple lawsuits, requiring the county to pay millions of 
dollars in legal fees.93 Against this background, MCSO’s task force 
agreement was revoked in 2009, but its jailhouse agreement was 
renewed.94 In 2011, DOJ issued a report finding that MCSO had 
engaged in a “pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing.”95 
Specifically, DOJ found evidence that MCSO engaged in racial 
profiling of Latinos, unlawfully stopped, detained, and arrested 
                                                                                                     
 91. See Natalie Allison Janicello, Alamance County May Rejoin 287(g), 
TIMES-NEWS (June 1, 2017, 5:49 PM), http://www.thetimesnews.com/news/ 
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 94. See Stephen Lemons, Joe Arpaio Scores 287(g) Jails Agreement in ICE 
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Sweeps, PHX. NEW TIMES (Oct. 16, 2009, 10:00 AM), 
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against the Sheriff’s office) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 95. See Letter from Thomas E. Perez, supra note 90, at 2 (noting the findings 
of the investigation into the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office). 
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Latinos, and unlawfully retaliated against individuals who 
complained or criticized its policies and practices.96 It was only 
after DOJ issued its report that ICE terminated MCSO’s jailhouse 
287(g) agreement and limited its access to the Secure Communities 
program as well.97  
These high-profile revocations, together with other problems 
in implementing the 287(g) program, decreased interest in the 
287(g) program from both the federal and sub-federal levels. At the 
end of 2016, there were only thirty-four active 287(g) agreements.98 
III. 287(g) Agreements in the Trump Era: On the Ground 
President Trump’s interest in the 287(g) program was 
apparent from the beginning of his administration, as reflected in 
his January 2017 executive orders calling for the expansion of the 
program.99 In the Border Security and Immigration Enforcement 
Executive Order, he directed the DHS Secretary to enter into more 
287(g) agreements and to “structure each agreement . . . in the 
manner that provides the most effective model for enforcing 
Federal immigration laws and obtaining operational control over 
the border for that jurisdiction.”100 That latter language opened the 
door to resurrecting the task force model that the Obama 
administration eliminated.101 
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Shortly after the executive orders were released, then-DHS 
Secretary John Kelly issued memos implementing, among other 
things, the 287(g) expansion. In his memo implementing the 
Border Security executive order, Secretary Kelly directed ICE to 
“expand the 287(g) Program to include all qualified law 
enforcement agencies that request to participate and meet all 
program requirements.”102 The Kelly memo also authorized 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to “accept State services and 
take other actions as appropriate to carry out immigration 
enforcement pursuant to section 287(g) of the INA.”103 That 
language appears to authorize CBP, as well as ICE, to enter into 
287(g) agreements. 
The Trump administration moved quickly to implement its 
plans, signing twenty-five new agreements in 2017 alone.104 These 
new agreements nearly doubled the thirty-four agreements that 
remained active from the Obama administration;105 seventeen of 
these new agreements were signed with Texas LEAs.106 As of 
November 2017, there were an additional thirty-nine LEAs that 
were interested in joining the program.107 If all of these interested 
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LEAs sign agreements, there would be over ninety active 287(g) 
jurisdictions, the largest in the program’s history108 and with 
expansive geographical reach.109 
 
Figure 1: Expansion of the 287(g) Program Under the 
Trump Administration 
 
 (Blue=Obama agreements at end of 2016, Red=Trump signed 
agreements in 2017, and Yellow=Interested LEA applicants as of 
Nov. 2017) 
A. Changing Profile of Deportees  
With a potentially record high number of LEAs signing 
agreements, the number of immigrants who will be identified and 
                                                                                                     
(2017), http://fingfx.thomsonreuters.com/gfx/rngs/TRUMP-EFFECT-IMMIGRA 
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 108. The previous high point in 287(g) participation was in 2011, when there 
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 109. See Figure 1. 
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placed into removal proceedings as a result of 287(g) operations 
under President Trump will inevitably increase. But we can also 
expect to see a change in the profile of those immigrants who are 
placed in removal through contact with the 287(g) program. With 
the institution of very broad enforcement priorities at the federal 
level, we should expect that immigration enforcement at the 
sub-federal level will similarly result in the arrest and removal of 
more unauthorized immigrants without criminal records.  
When he revoked the Obama administration’s immigration 
enforcement priorities,110 President Trump replaced them with 
incredibly broad priorities: any removable alien who has been 
convicted of any crime, charged with a crime, committed acts that 
constitute a crime, engaged in any fraud or misrepresentation 
before a government agency, abused public benefits, has a final 
order of removal, or “[i]n the judgment of an immigration officer, 
otherwise pose[s] a risk to public safety or national security.”111 
Trump’s policy did not prioritize between these categories, leading 
Professor David Martin to observe, “[a]n old canard applies: [w]hen 
everything is a priority, nothing is a priority. In practice, this 
feature gives individual agents wide latitude to follow their own 
preferences—or perhaps biases.”112 Moreover, regarding the 
criminal categories, Martin noted 
[t]here is no distinction between felonies and misdemeanors, 
and even people charged but not yet tried get thrown into this 
capacious criminal pot. Indeed, there doesn’t even need to be a 
charge—just an immigration agent’s determination that the 
person committed a criminal act, even years ago—presumably 
including even the misdemeanor of entering the US without 
inspection.113 
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In his February 2017 memo implementing these priorities, 
then-DHS Secretary Kelly stated: “The Department no longer will 
exempt classes or categories of removable aliens from potential 
enforcement.”114 
Enforcement statistics from 2017 show the impact of these 
new priorities. In its FY 2017 report, ICE touts its increased 
interior arrests and removals based on those arrests (as compared 
with previous years under the Obama administration).115 The 
agency also noted a substantial increase in its administrative 
arrests (arrests solely based on a civil immigration violation) to 
143,470 in 2017, from 110,104 in FY 2016 under the Obama 
administration.116 The agency attributes this increase to the 
administration’s new priorities and specifically to its decision not 
to exempt any category of immigrants from enforcement. 
Anecdotal information also reflects the impact of the new 
enforcement priorities. The media reports regularly on the 
heart-wrenching deportation of immigrants who have lived in the 
country for many years, established successful careers, and leave 
behind U.S. citizen family members. For example, in April 2017, 
Roberto Beristain was deported to Mexico, after illegally crossing 
into the U.S. nearly twenty years prior.117 In those twenty years, 
he married a U.S. citizen, had three U.S. citizen children, and 
owned and operated a popular restaurant, Eddie’s Steak Shed in 
Granger, Indiana.118 Significantly, he had no criminal record, but 
despite years of trying to obtain legal status, he had a final order 
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of removal, which made him a priority for deportation under the 
Trump administration.119 The story of Jorge Garcia of Lincoln 
Park, Michigan, is similar. He was brought illegally to the U.S. 
from Mexico as a child, nearly thirty years ago.120 He, too, married 
a U.S. citizen and had two U.S. citizen children, whom he 
supported through his work as a landscaper.121 Mr. Garcia had no 
criminal record and tried to obtain a green card, based on his 
marriage; however, his immigration attorney filed the wrong 
paperwork, resulting in a removal order.122 During the Obama 
administration, he was allowed to remain in the U.S. pending 
annual meetings with ICE; in 2017, however, he was deported to 
Mexico.123 
Regarding the 287(g) program specifically, we can expect to 
find similar shifts in enforcement, with more immigrants without 
criminal records being identified and placed in removal as a result 
of their 287(g) encounters. On its website, ICE continues to refer 
to its mission to “ensure enforcement efforts remain focused on 
criminal aliens, particularly those who pose the greatest risk to 
public safety.”124 Yet given that federal enforcement priorities have 
changed under the Trump administration and that LEAs are 
required to abide by those federal priorities, we will likely see a 
magnification of the trend that the MPI observed in its 2011 study: 
that LEAs set enforcement priorities for their individual 287(g) 
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programs, influenced by local political pressure.125 In fact, with 
this broadening of federal enforcement priorities, the program may 
become more attractive to LEAs interested in universal 
enforcement. 
B. More Powerful Forms of Agreements 
Through executive orders and agency memos, the Trump 
administration has encouraged the use of alternative 287(g) 
agreement models: the task force model of enforcement and a 
border patrol model agreement.126 None of the new agreements 
signed by this administration in 2017 employ either model, but if 
future agreements used these alternative models, the result would 
give LEAs more expansive powers. The implications of that 
expansion are explored in this section.  
As noted earlier, the task force model has deep roots in the 
program. Before the Obama administration discontinued it, the 
task force model was used predominantly by state and city LEAs, 
while counties favored the jail or hybrid models. This alignment 
made sense as counties usually operate the local jails, whereas city 
police departments make arrests and detain individuals only for a 
short time before transferring them to county jails for longer-term 
detentions.127 If the Trump administration resurrects the task 
force model, it could, of course, deviate from the Obama 
administration’s practices. But absent any indication that it plans 
to do so and given the interest from at least some 287(g) applicants 
in the task force model,128 it is informative to understand how this 
model operated under the Obama administration. 
The Prince William Police Department signed a typical task 
force agreement in 2009 and gave 287(g) trained officers the usual 
powers of a jailhouse agreement: the power to interrogate 
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detainees about their immigration status; serve immigration 
arrest warrants; prepare evidence related to immigration 
proceedings; issue immigration detainer requests, prepare 
charging documents; and transport detainees to immigration 
detention facilities.129 As a result of the task force agreement, these 
officers had the additional authority to: interview and arrest 
someone solely based on an immigration violation (with ICE 
approval); arrest for immigration felonies without a warrant if the 
individual is likely to escape; and arrest for any federal crime 
committed in the officer’s presence.130 
 The distinguishing characteristic of the task force model then 
was the authority it gave to LEAs to investigate and prosecute 
based on immigration offenses alone, without needing the 
predicate criminal offense required by the jail house model (where 
an LEA could only exercise its delegated immigration powers on 
immigrants detained on separate, non-immigration charges). This 
broad discretion that could be exercised “on the beat” raised 
concerns that the model was particularly vulnerable to racial 
profiling and other illegal abuses. These concerns, coupled with the 
rising utility of the Secure Communities program, motivated the 
Obama administration in 2012 to retire the task force model from 
the 287(g) program.131 President Trump resurrecting this model 
would raise similar concerns about racial profiling.  
The second alternative model that the Trump administration 
has encouraged would allow Customs and Border Protection to 
sign agreements with LEAs under the 287(g) program. 
Administration officials have not spoken further about what a 
CBP-signed agreement might look like, nor is there precedent for 
this kind of agreement in the program’s history.132 But based on 
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the CBP’s powers and authority, we can make some educated 
guesses about how this kind of agreement might operate. The 
CBP’s mission is “[t]o safeguard America’s borders thereby 
protecting the public from dangerous people and materials while 
enhancing the Nation’s global economic competitiveness by 
enabling legitimate trade and travel.”133 Looking at the CBP’s 
specific responsibilities related to immigration and the resources 
that LEAs control, the most obvious operations where CBP could 
delegate authority and receive assistance would be in border 
patrols. While it would be logistically difficult and expensive for 
LEAs to assist with actual line watches (where CBP agents 
monitor the physical land border), LEAs could provide support 
through traffic checks, traffic observation, city patrols and 
transportation checks. They could also do joint operations with 
CBP related to anti-smuggling activities.134 Related to these new 
operations, CBP could delegate to LEAs powers associated with the 
task force model: the powers to interrogate, arrest, and process for 
removal based on evidence of civil immigration offenses.135 
An agreement with CBP would obviously give an LEA new 
powers in a broad context, especially if combined with an 
additional agreement with ICE. The general concerns that exist 
with any broad expansion of 287(g) powers apply here: will the 
newly deputized officers receive adequate training to carry out 
their new duties effectively? Will there be sufficient federal 
controls to prevent racial profiling and other illegal acts? Will local 
immigrant communities and immigrant advocacy groups be 
consulted in the implementation of the program? But because CBP 
has been recognized to have extra-constitutional powers within its 
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special jurisdiction (100 miles of any external boundary of the 
U.S.136), there are special questions that a CBP agreement would 
raise. For example, CBP has authority to operate immigration 
checkpoints, pulling over individuals when its agents have 
“reasonable suspicion” that an immigration violation or crime has 
occurred.137 Moreover, CBP agents can enter private property 
without a warrant (except for dwellings) within twenty-five miles 
of any border.138 Would these extra-constitutional powers transfer 
over to LEAs? If so, what measures would CBP and LEAs take to 
prevent abuse of these powers? 
C. Civil Rights Enforced? 
As we consider the impact of the Trump Administration on the 
287(g) program, perhaps the biggest question is how the 
administration will respond to allegations and evidence of racial 
profiling and other illegal practices by program participants. The 
vulnerability of the program to racial profiling, illegal searches, 
and other abuses has been widely documented; and as the Trump 
administration seeks to expand the program, those abuses will 
occur. The question then becomes, how will the administration 
respond? The evidence thus far strongly suggests that the 
administration does not prioritize civil rights in the context of 
immigration law enforcement.139  
The vulnerability of the 287(g) program to racial profiling has 
been well-documented. The DOJ’s findings of racial profiling and 
other abuses committed by Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (AZ) 
and the Alamance County Sheriff’s Office (NC) have already been 
analyzed.140 Academic studies have found similar evidence of 
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racial profiling once 287(g) programs are implemented within a 
jurisdiction. For example, when the Frederick County Sheriff’s 
Office (MD) implemented its 287(g) program in 2008, it started 
arresting eleven to thirteen more Hispanics per month than would 
be expected without the program.141 This finding was based on 
data compiled from FCSO’s individual arrest records for the period 
between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2013, using 
difference-in-difference estimates.142 Based on these findings, the 
researcher concluded that there was a “shift in attention by the 
FCSO away from the white and black community toward the 
Hispanic community following the implementation of the 287(g) 
program.”143 
When the Trump Administration does receive complaints of 
LEA bad acts, compelling evidence suggests that it will not 
necessarily prioritize civil rights enforcement or view racial 
profiling as a negative. Candidate Trump, in his speech 
announcing his bid for the presidency, engaged in an infamous 
example of racial profiling when he described Mexican immigrants 
as drug dealers and rapists, though studies show that first 
generation immigrants commit crimes at a lower rate than 
native-born Americans.144 During that speech, he said: 
When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. 
They’re not sending you. . . . They’re sending people that have 
lots of problems, and they’re bringing those problems with us. 
They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. 
And some, I assume, are good people.145 
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Zooming in closer to the 287(g) program itself, there is more 
evidence of the administration’s disregard for racial profiling 
concerns. In the spring of 2017, the administration approached 
Sheriff Terry Johnson of Alamance County (NC) and invited the 
county to apply to participate again in the 287(g) program.146 
Sheriff Johnson was the sheriff of Alamance County Sheriff’s 
Office when ICE revoked its 287(g) agreement in 2012; that 
revocation was based on DOJ findings that the ACSO had engaged 
in intentional and illegal racial profiling, rooted in Sheriff 
Johnson’s prejudice against Latinos.147 Admittedly, the DOJ 
lawsuit against ACSO was dismissed in federal court, but the 
specific circumstances need to be understood: to avoid further 
appeals, ACSO settled, agreeing to implement bias-free policing, 
citizen-complaint, and data-collection policies.148 The ACSO’s 
troubled record on civil rights and the continued leadership of 
Sheriff Johnson should have given the Trump administration 
pause, but instead, the administration reached out and invited the 
department to re-apply for 287(g) participation.149 
The most damning evidence, however, is President Trump’s 
pardon of Sheriff Joe Arpaio in August 2017.150 Sheriff Arpaio led 
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the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office when the Obama 
administration revoked its 287(g) agreements, based on evidence 
that the sheriff and his deputies engaged in racial profiling in 
implementing their 287(g) responsibilities.151 But the Sheriff’s 
legal problems were not limited to the 287(g) program. In 2007, 
Sheriff Arpaio and the MCSO were sued by a Mexican national 
with a valid tourist visa who was wrongfully detained for nine 
hours on suspicion of violating immigration laws.152 The lawsuit 
became a class action filed on behalf of Latino drivers in Maricopa 
County.153 After four years of litigation, a federal judge in 2011 
ordered the defendants to stop enforcing civil immigration laws, 
ruling that they lacked the legal authority to do so.154 Over the next 
six years, Sheriff Arpaio continued to defy the federal order, 
ordering his deputies to make immigration-based stops and lying 
under oath.155 In 2017, the sheriff was convicted in a federal bench 
trial of criminal contempt of court and faced a possible six-month 
jail sentence.156 
In announcing his pardon, President Trump tweeted, “I am 
pleased to inform you that I have just granted a full Pardon to 
85-year-old American patriot Sheriff Joe Arpaio. He kept Arizona 
safe!”157 Political analysts opined that the President was sending a 
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message to his political base, who share Arpaio’s immigration 
positions and consider him a hero.158 But some analysts suggested 
that the pardon had a more targeted audience: reassuring sheriffs 
across the country who feared possible legal problems if they 
cooperate with federal immigration enforcement.159 For immigrant 
advocates and others monitoring the 287(g) program, the pardon 
represented damning evidence of the administration’s disdain for 
civil rights enforcement in the immigration law context.160 
IV. Conclusion 
This Article has analyzed the differences, actual and expected, 
between the Trump administration’s implementation of the 287(g) 
program and that of his predecessors. Those differences—the 
identification of more removable immigrants without criminal 
records, the use of more powerful agreement forms, and grave 
concerns about this administration’s commitment to civil rights 
enforcement—have been analyzed separately and in some detail. 
But it is the combination of these policy differences that is 
powerful, providing a troubling picture of what the 287(g) program 
will look like under the Trump administration. In essence, the 
program will be a supercharged version of what operated under 
Presidents Bush or Obama, with few federal controls and little 
federal interest in those controls. The end result will be the 
magnification of the program’s flaws as it operated in previous 
iterations, on a larger scale and reaching more jurisdictions. 
* * * 
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